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International law scholars who participate in legal proceedings as amici curiae occupy 
an interesting space at the nexus between the ‘science’ and ‘praxis’ of international 
law.
1
 The scholarship contained in their interventions has been described as a possible 
manifestation of ‘scholarship of action’, as distinct from more pure forms of 
researched-based ‘academic scholarship’.
2
 This is an especially apt label in the case of 
scholars who prepare amicus briefs in conjunction with NGOs and other advocacy 
groups, such as the many law school clinics established at (mainly American) 
universities. Indeed, the submissions of such actors frequently transgress the realm of 
scholarship altogether and take the form of outright advocacy. 
 
The scope of this article does not encompass every form of amicus 
participation in which scholars are involved. Its focus is more narrowly on amicus 
briefs submitted by academics qua academics. By that we mean not only that the 
briefs are submitted by academics in their own names (rather than in conjunction with 
NGOs or law clinics) but also that they purport (explicitly or implicitly) to possess 
special qualities by virtue of their scholarly provenance. As Richard Fallon puts it in 
his discussion of academic amici in the US context, the activity under scrutiny 
involves: 
                                                        
1 See M. Lachs The Teacher in International Law: Teachings and Teaching (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 
228 for a general discussion of the interaction between these two spheres. 
2
 See C Stahn and E de Brabandere, ‘The Future of International Legal Scholarship: Some Thoughts on 
“Practice”, “Growth” and “Dissemination”’, 27 LJIL 1, especially at 2, where the authors draw on the 
reflections of A. Oraison. 
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... representing oneself as having a distinctive expertise that depends on 
notions of integrity that are internal to the scholarly enterprise. Someone 
claiming scholarly expertise thus sets herself apart from those seeking to 
participate in a case based on ideological interests. Professors who join 
scholars’ briefs aim to engender distinctive, role-based expectations 
concerning the character of their participation.
3
 
 
Such scholars’ briefs, which have become a significant feature of appellate litigation 
in the US during the latter decades of the 20
th
 century, are increasingly being 
submitted before international courts and tribunals. Indeed, our survey of publically 
accessible unsolicited academic interventions before international forums shows that 
about half were filed after 2010.
4
 This emerging trend presents interesting challenges 
and opportunities for the international adjudicative process.  
 
The central concern of this article is to determine whether, and to what extent, 
a new kind of scholar-adjudicator dialogue is emerging – beyond the constraints of 
the traditional approach towards doctrine enshrined in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ 
Statute – as a result of the submissions of academic amici. While contending that 
academic amicus participation has the potential to reshape the interaction between the 
spheres of international law scholarship and international adjudication in meaningful 
ways, we observe that in practice adjudicators are often reticent when faced with 
unsolicited scholarly submissions. However, there are some signs of productive 
                                                        
3 R. Fallon, ‘Scholars’ briefs and the vocation of law professors’ (2012) 4(1) Journal of Legal Analysis 
223, 237.  
4
 We refer to 28 academic amicus briefs in this article. The pre-2010 numbers are skewed by the fact 
that in Blaskic (infra, note 118) the ICTY accepted nine scholars’ briefs, after issuing an open 
invitation (but not specific invitations) for scholars to intervene.  
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engagement  - the encounter is not quite the ‘dialogue of the deaf’ that our title 
provocatively hints at.   
 
Part 1 of the article charts the rise of the academic amicus in the context of the 
evolution of amicus participation generally. Part 2 identifies the main challenges that 
academic amicus participation presents to the traditional dynamic between 
scholarship and international adjudication. Part 3 reviews the practice across a range 
of international courts and tribunals. Part 4 contains some concluding reflections.    
 
 
1. THE RISE OF THE ACADEMIC AMICUS IN DOMESTIC LITIGATION 
 
A survey of legal dictionaries reveals that the role of amicus is understood to 
encompass two broad elements. The first is an assumed independence or neutrality; 
the amicus is defined as a ‘by stander’,
5
 ‘stander by’,
6
 ‘non-party’,
7
 or one ‘without 
having an interest in the cause’.
8
 The second element relates to the amicus’s expertise; 
the amicus must possess the ability to ‘assist [the court] with research, argument, or 
submissions’,
9
 correct the court ‘when a judge is doubtful or mistaken’,
10
 contribute 
knowledge of facts or laws which the court has ‘overlooked’, or ‘does not at the 
moment remember’.
11
 Scholars tend to pride themselves both on their independence 
                                                        
5
 D. Greenberg (ed.), Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (3
rd
 ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 2010). 
6
 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary), (The Lawbook Exchange, 2006 (originally 
printed in 1843) 106. 
7 J. Law (ed.) Oxford Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press 2015), 35.  
8
 Abbott's Dictionary of Words and Phrases, as cited in Krislov, infra, note 12 at 694.  
9
 Oxford Dictionary of Law, supra note 7. 
10
 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, supra note 6. 
11 H.J. Holthouse, A New Law Dictionary (Holthouse Law Dictionary) (Thomas Blenkarn, 1850),19.  
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and on their possession of expertise. However, they have had relatively little 
involvement as amici historically.
12
  
 
Amicus interventions were first documented in 14
th
 century England,
13
 but 
they remained infrequent until the 19
th
 century, when the function of amicus began to 
develop in common law jurisdictions as a means of ensuring the representation of 
third-party rights, which in an adversarial process are often left unprotected.
14
 Krislov 
makes the following observation regarding this development:
15
 
 
While the courts continued to cling to the proposition that the amicus was a 
detached servant of the court –‘he acts for no one, but simply seeks to give 
information to the court’ [footnote omitted] - his services no longer precluded 
commitment to a cause. Indeed, the very notion of his acting for no one was 
belied by his rising to do just the opposite-in many instances to act directly 
and officially as counsel for one not formally a party to the case.  
 
The subsequent evolution of the amicus function in legal systems such as the 
UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
16
 and France,
17
 is well 
                                                        
12
 See S. Krislov, ‘The amicus curiae brief: From friendship to advocacy’ (1962) 72 Yale Law Journal 
694 for an account of the evolution of the amicus function.  
13
 See review in S. Chandra Mohan, ‘The amicus curiae: Friends no more?’ (2010) Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 4-5. Also E. Angell, ‘The amicus curiae American development of English 
institutions’ (1967) 16 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1017.  
14
 M. Lowman, ‘The litigating amicus curiae: When does the party begin after the friends leave?’ 
(1991) 41 American University Law Review 1243, 1250; also generally J. Koch, ‘Making room: New 
directions in third party intervention’ (1990) 48 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 151; P. 
Collins, Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest groups and judicial decision making (OUP, 2008).  
15
 Krislov, supra note 12, at 697. 
16
 See E. Metcalfe, To assist the court: Third party interventions in the UK, (Justice, 2009) 39. 
17 C. Coslin and D. Lapillonne, ‘France and the concept of amicus curiae: what lies ahead?’, (2012) 
Paris International Litigation Bulletin no. 4, Hogan Lovells, available online: 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/15047541-a7a6-476a-ae82-
<ffeb97083564/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e6a90da3-ee0c-49c9-b87c-0ac138f8217e/6%20-
%20France%20and%20the%20concept%20of%20amicus%20curiae.pdf>. 
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documented. The UK legal system recognizes that amici perform a variety of discrete 
functions, and that a more nuanced taxonomy is therefore required when regulating 
these functions as a matter of procedural law. The traditional expert amicus – 
appointed by the court to provide neutral expertise – is today referred to in the UK as 
an ‘Advocate to the Court’.
18
 The more modern ‘advocate’ amicus – a representative 
of unrepresented interests, both private and public
19
 – is referred to as an 
‘intervener’.
20
 A third category of amicus is a person appointed by the court on behalf 
of an unrepresented party (for example, on behalf of a child in family law 
proceedings).
21
 While scholars are arguably best suited to the first of these roles, most 
amicus interventions in the UK Supreme Court are by interveners.
22
 The interveners 
in those cases are often well-known NGOs like Liberty and Amnesty. Although 
scholars may be involved in the preparation of these NGO submissions, they tend not 
to appear as amici in their own name.  
 
All three incarnations of the amicus identified in UK procedural law – expert, 
advocate, and court-nominated representative of unrepresented parties – find 
expression on the international plane.
23
 However, the practice of academic amici 
before international courts and tribunals mirrors the practice in the US more than that 
of any other jurisdiction.  
 
                                                        
18
 Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The Supreme Court Rules 2009, No. 1603 (L.17), Rule 35.  
19 Ibid, Rule 26. 
20
Ibid, Rule XX. 
21
 Metcalfe, supra note 16, at 7-8.  
22
 L. Neudorf, ‘Intervention at the UK Supreme Court’, (2013) 2(1) Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 16, observes (at 25) that 36.5% of cases in the Supreme Court in 2012 involved 
third-party interventions. 
23
 As to the third category, ‘amici’ are frequently appointed to represent defendants who refuse 
representation in international criminal proceedings. However, this is not an activity that can be termed 
‘scholarly’ in any sense, and it is therefore outside the scope of this article.  
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Unlike the UK, no regulatory distinction is made in the US between the 
‘expert’ and ‘advocacy’ roles. In practice there is a fair amount of slippage between 
the two, partly because it is common for academic amici in the US to submit 
unsolicited briefs whose scope is not constrained by the terms of a court appointment 
(as the submissions of a British ‘Advocate to the Court’ would be).  
 
In 2013, an average of fourteen amicus briefs were submitted to the US 
Supreme Court per case, most dealing with issues of significant public importance.
24
 
For example, during the 2012-2013 term, 156 amicus briefs were submitted in same-
sex marriage cases, and during the 2011-2012 term 136 briefs were submitted in 
health care cases.
25
 Like the UK, most of these briefs are filed by civil society 
organisations. Unlike the UK, academics also frequently submit unsolicited amicus 
briefs before the US appellate courts. Many of the briefs in question are filed by 
international law academics. Highly contentious issues, such as the legality of the use 
of force,
26
 detention without trial,
27
 or the enforcement of treaties in the US courts
28
 
tend to draw high-profile academic amici in droves.  
 
Group submissions are common, and there is an evident concern among amici 
to present their submissions as ‘pure’ international law scholarship and to distance 
themselves from moral or political agendas. As with all forms of scholarship, it is 
important to remain alert to the possible existence of hidden agendas in these 
                                                        
24
 A. Franze & R.R. Anderson, ‘The Supreme Court’s reliance on Amicus Curiae in the 2012-13 term’ 
(2013) The National Law Journal, available online: 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/NLJ_The%20Supreme%20Court's%20Reliance%2
0on%20Amicus%20Curiae%20in%20the%202012-13%20Term_Franze%20and%20Anderson.pdf.. 
25
 Ibid.  
26 Ronald Dellums v. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, 27 
Stanford Journal of International Law (1991) 257. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 US 557 (2006), Amicus Brief of Louis Henkin et al, available online: 
http://www.oyez.org/node/61149.   
Page 6 of 34
Cambridge University Press
Leiden Journal of International Law
For Review Only
7 
 
submissions. However, the stated scope of the amicus submissions in high-profile 
cases like Dellums v Bush and Hamdan v Rumsfeld is very much in line with the type 
of brief one might expect of a court-appointed expert amicus (or an ‘Advocate to the 
Court’ in the British system). In the first of those cases, the brief was said to be 
limited solely to ‘matters of constitutional principle, not to the morality or political 
wisdom of any executed or contemplated governmental action’; in the second, the 
stated aim of the amici was to provide a ‘historical perspective on the enforcement of 
treaties in US courts’.
29
 
 
Unsolicited scholars’ briefs such as those referred to above are frequently 
deemed to meet the Supreme Court’s procedural requirement of ‘bring[ing] to the 
attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the 
parties’ which ‘may be of considerable help to the Court’.
30
   
 
In a critical review of scholars’ briefs in a US context, Richard Fallon expresses 
scepticism at the claims of scholarly neutrality that one so often sees in these 
submissions. He argues that in many cases these briefs are ‘actually not very 
scholarly’.
31
 He attributes the perceived lack of scholarliness to factors such as a 
tendency to seek the support (and signature) of many scholars, which Fallon claims 
tends to result in overly generalized briefs.
32
 Fallon is also critical of the fact that 
some scholars sign briefs that are outside their exact field of specialisation.
33
 His 
overall assessment is rather grim:  
 
                                                        
29 See supra, notes 26 and 28. 
30
 Rule 37, Rules of the United States Supreme Court.  
31
 Fallon, supra, note 3 at 228.  
32
 Ibid at 233-234. 
33 Ibid at 234. 
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To be blunt, law professors recurrently attempt to leverage their credibility as 
teachers and scholars to influence non-scholarly audiences, sometimes for 
personal gain and sometimes without satisfying the standards on which their 
scholarly reputations depend.
34
 
 
Although the academic amicus is now well established in the US and other 
domestic jurisdictions, it has only recently emerged as a noteworthy phenomenon in 
the international arena.
35
 The practice before international courts and tribunals is still 
insufficiently developed to warrant the kind of wide-ranging critique that Fallon has 
subjected the US practice to. However, given the recent marked increase in academic 
amicus submissions before international forums, it is worth commencing a discussion 
of this nascent practice and its systemic implications.  
 
2. ACADEMIC AMICI IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS: EXPANDING THE 
SCHOLAR-ADJUDICATOR DIALOGUE?  
 
In recent years, a growing emphasis on transparency, legitimacy and public 
participation has made it easier for amici (in general) to intervene in international 
disputes.
36
 There also appears to be a growing appreciation of the valuable role that 
                                                        
34
 Ibid at 228. 
35
 See our review of the practice at Section 3, infra. 
36
 See for example E. De Brabandere, ‘Rationale of amicus curiae interventions in international 
economic and investment disputes’ (2011-2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 85; also, L. 
Bartholomeusz, ‘The amicus curiae before international courts and tribunals’ (2005) 5 Non-State 
Actors and International Law 209, 283-283; G. Marceau and M. Hurley, ‘Transparency and Public 
Participation in the WTO: A report card on WTO transparency mechanisms’ (2012) 4(1) Trade, Law 
and Development 19. 
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amici can play in gathering additional factual and legal information, especially in 
complex disputes.
37
  
 
Most forums are open to at least some form of amicus participation. While the 
ICJ Statute can hardly be described as fertile procedural ground for would-be amici, 
the ICJ is open in principle to receiving amicus briefs from ‘public international 
organizations’ in contentious cases (although it does so rarely, and has interpreted the 
term ‘public international organization’ to the exclusion of NGOs).
38
 The ICJ model 
is predicated on the broader rationale that it is not enough for an amicus to be of 
assistance; there must also be a ‘public interest’ imperative to warrant participation.
39
 
In proceedings before the ICJ, the public interest requirement is very tightly 
construed.
40
 Academic amici cannot even get a foot in the door, let alone entertain the 
prospect that the ICJ might engage with the substance of their submissions.
41
 
 
Other courts and tribunals adopt a more permissive approach. Since the late 
1990s in particular, a significant increase in amicus participation can be observed 
across international judicial and arbitral forums.
42
 Academics cannot usually lay claim 
                                                        
37
 D. Steger, ‘Amicus curiae: Participant or friend? The WTO and NAFTA experience’ in von 
Bogdandy, Marvoidis & Mény (eds.), European integration and international coordination: Studies in 
honor of Clause-Dieter Ehlermann  (Kluwer, 2002) 419, 421-422; Bartholomeusz, supra, note 36, at  
278.   
38
 Art. 34(2), ICJ Statute. Note however that memorials by NGOs have occasionally been appended to 
those of states. For a discussion of the ICJ practice see De Brabandere, supra, note 36 at 91-94.    
39
 On the public interest rationale, see De Brabandere, supra, note 36 at 103. 
40
 See submission to the ICJ in the Asylum Case, by the International League for the Rights of Man in 
1950. The submission was not accepted as it was determined that the League was not a ‘public 
international organization’, and thus does not qualify according to the conditions of Art. 34 of the ICJ 
Statute.   
41
 See Letter from Professor WM Reisman to the Registrar, 10 September 1970, ICJ Pleadings 1971, 
Vol. II, 636; Letter from the Registrar to Professor Reisman, 6 November 1970, ICJ Pleadings 1971, 
Vol. II, at 638.  
42
 See for example a factual review of the participation of NGOs as amici before the European Court of 
Human Rights, in L. Van den Eynde, ‘An empirical look at the Amicus Curiae practice of human rights 
NGOs before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 31(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 271, 280; For a review of the cases in which amici attempted to intervene in investment 
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to represent a public constituency, beyond the limited claim that they are members of 
the public themselves. However, this has not stopped them from seeking to infiltrate 
the procedural space that has been opened up by the drive towards greater public 
involvement in international adjudicative processes. Often they seek to do so by 
‘piggy-backing’ onto the advocacy-oriented submissions of NGOs and law clinics.
43
 
Increasingly, however, they seek to intervene qua academics. Before examining the 
practice in the latter area, we will consider some of the implications of this 
development from a theoretical perspective.  
 
For reasons we explain below, the traditional dynamic between scholarship 
and the international adjudicative function is very much adjudicator-driven, but it is 
also premised on the notion that international law scholarship is a judicial resource of 
considerable value. Our basic contention is that the emergence of the academic 
amicus on the international plane has the potential to disrupt, but also enrich, this 
traditional dynamic.  
 
In cases involving international law, the positive law can be relatively thin; 
judges are frequently required to discern rules from a morass of state practice and 
opinio juris. As a consequence, international law scholarship arguably has a bigger 
impact on judicial decision-making than scholarship in other fields of law. In the 
Paquete Habana case, the US Supreme Court extolled the usefulness of international 
law scholarship, lauding:  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
arbitration, see L. Bastin, ‘The Amicus Curiae in investor-state arbitration’ (2012) 1(3) Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 208; For a similar review in a WTO litigation context, 
see Marceau and Hurley, supra, note 36..  
43 This practice is particularly widespread in the ECtHR – see generally Van den Eynde supra, note 42.  
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… the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and 
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects 
of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
44
  
 
Half a century later, the same sentiment would find expression in Article 
38(1)(d) of the ICJ statute, which refers to ‘the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations’ as a ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law’. Scholarship is thus conceived in Paquete Habana and in the ‘applicable law’ 
clause of the ICJ not as a source of law, but as a potentially valuable resource when 
the court is having difficulty deciding what the law is.    
 
Traditionally, it is for a court to decide whether, when and how to engage with 
teachings (invariably contained in books and articles) in its work. When the need 
arises (or when it serves the interest of the court) it is also for the court to decide 
which teachings to consider. On this model, any initiation of a scholar-adjudicator 
dialogue is firmly in the hands of the adjudicator. International adjudicators are often 
world-renowned experts in international law and may not need to consult academic 
scholarship with respect to each and every question.
45
 The traditional model allows 
judges to identify those questions on which academic scholarship may be helpful, and 
avoid a constant time- and resource-consuming dialogue on each and every question.  
 
                                                        
44
 175 U.S. 677 (1900) 700. 
45
 Indeed only in a very small number of cases the ICJ have explicitly relied on academic sources. See 
M. Peil, ‘Scholarly writings as a source of law: A survey of the use of doctrine by the international 
court of justice’ (2012) (1)3 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 136, 151.  
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A proliferation of unsolicited academic amicus submissions threatens to 
disrupt this arrangement. It raises fears of the nightmare scenario envisaged by the 
ICJ in its correspondence with Professor Michael Reisman concerning his proposed 
amicus intervention in the Namibia case, where the Court stated it wished to guard 
against the ‘floodgates’ being opened ‘to what might be a vast amount of proffered 
assistance’.
46
 The more scope scholars have to participate as amici, the less 
adjudicators are able to control the initiation and terms of the dialogue. In the new 
landscape, scholarship is no longer a static resource for adjudicators to draw upon. 
Instead, it is being pushed actively onto the judges’ desks. If the upward trend in 
academic amicus participation continues, it will result in more work for international 
courts and tribunals, especially those which  - unlike the ICJ - actively consider all 
unsolicited amicus briefs before deciding whether to accept or reject them (like 
NAFTA tribunals or the ICTY).
47
  
 
The increased prominence of academic amici also raises questions of quality 
control. The identification of the ‘most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations’ involves a degree of subjectivity, but it generally results in the consultation 
of a confined list of ‘authorities’
48
 who are widely considered to be persuasive and 
authoritative.
49
 Many of the ‘teachings’ that are consulted have firmly stood the test 
of time, as frequent judicial references to the likes of Grotius and Vattel attest. By 
contrast, the quality of academic amicus submissions is not assured.
50
 In the new 
                                                        
46
 ICJ/Reisman correspondence, supra, note 41, at 638-9. 
47
 For commentary on the NAFTA and ICTY practice regarding academic amici see sections 3.2.2 and 
3.2.5, infra. 
48 See for example the list of the most cited scholars by the ICJ, in Peil, supra note 45, 158-160. 
49
 Article 38 (1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
50
 Concerns regarding the scientific quality of amicus briefs were raised in the United States, see for 
example M..Rustad and T..Koenig, ‘The supreme court and junk social science: Selective distortion in 
amicus briefs’ (1993) 72 North Carolina Law Review 91; In other studies respondents answered that 
Page 12 of 34
Cambridge University Press
Leiden Journal of International Law
For Review Only
13 
 
landscape, adjudicators who are used to engaging at their own initiative with what 
they consider to be the crème de la crème of scholarship, may increasingly find 
themselves confronted with the writings of any researcher who has enough ambition 
and an Internet connection. 
 
The traditional approach towards ‘teachings’ also contains a safeguard against 
the sort of scholarly opportunism identified by Fallon, who is critical of the tendency 
he observes among law professors to use their academic credentials in order to 
influence a specific case for personal gains.
51
 Unlike academic articles and books, the 
amicus submissions of scholars are ‘tailored-made’ for specific, not-yet-decided 
cases. Scholars may be hired by interested parties who seek to confer ‘academic’ 
credibility on their desired legal outcomes. The same could be said regarding the 
promotion of political agendas; academics may try to ‘leverage their credibility as 
teachers and scholars’,
52
 offering what is presented as their ‘distinctively scholarly 
expertise and perspective’
53
 to promote a political goal. One international law 
academic amicus offers the following reflection:  
 
I have had long suppressed questions about why courts should accept these 
briefs at all, given that they seem to me – my amicus briefs and everyone 
else’s – just advocacy leveraged by quite specious claims of ‘neutral’ 
expertise. Meaning by ‘specious’ – the expertise is real, the neutrality is not.
54
  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
amicus briefs could be improved through ‘better social science research’: see V. Flango et al  ‘Amicus 
curiae briefs: The court’s perspective’ (2006) 27(2) The Justice System Journal 180, 189. 
51 Fallon, supra, note 3 at 228. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 K..Anderson, ‘Richard Fallon on Law Professor Amicus Briefs’ Opinio Juris, 28 Oct 2011, available 
online: http://opiniojuris.org/2011/10/28/richard-fallon-on-law-professor-amicus-briefs/..  
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Notwithstanding such concerns, the rise of the academic amicus can also be 
viewed in a positive light. It has the potential to liberalize and facilitate the scholar-
adjudicator dialogue. It generates a greater plurality of voices, undermining the 
monopoly enjoyed by a small set of highly distinguished scholars, most of whom are 
of a certain age, gender and origin.
55
 This can in turn result in a more competitive 
environment with respect to ideas and arguments, one based on persuasiveness and 
not necessarily on reputation.  
 
Furthermore, the academic amicus trend may also allow for scholarly 
involvement that is more timely and fact-sensitive. Through amicus submissions, 
scholars can comment on the specific circumstances of a specific case, and the 
manner in which the law should be read in this precise context. Scholars’ briefs may 
be more ‘on point’ than academic literature, especially when courts and tribunals are 
considering novel issues which the academic literature has not yet addressed.  
 
While the rise of the academic amicus on the international plane therefore has 
the potential to transform the nature and scope of the scholar-adjudicator dialogue in 
meaningful ways, it is not clear whether it is currently doing so in practice. As we 
observe in the following section, international courts and tribunals that are open in 
principle to amicus submissions by academics are not usually sympathetic towards 
these submissions, with certain exceptions.  
 
 
 
                                                        
55 See Peil’s review of the most cited scholars in the ICJ, supra, note 45,158-160. 
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3. A REVIEW OF THE PRACTICE  
 
Any attempt to conduct a comprehensive review of the practice in this area is 
complicated by the fact that an unknown number of academic submissions are 
discarded without official acknowledgment, and thus may never see the light of day, 
unless their authors seek to publish them elsewhere. Furthermore, where a procedural 
record exists to the effect that a submission has been considered and rejected, it is rare 
for reasons to be given, let alone detailed reasons. It is nevertheless possible to derive 
certain insights from the growing body of practice.  
 
While the most interesting developments concern the judicial reception of 
unsolicited briefs, the most productive form of dialogue between the academic and 
judicial spheres occurs when expert amici are invited by courts and tribunals to 
provide scholarly expertise. It is to this aspect of the practice that we turn first.    
 
3.1 The invited academic amicus 
 
Given the status accorded to international law scholarship in the judicial decision-
making process, it is unsurprising that courts and tribunals have found it valuable on 
occasion to invite scholars of international law to participate in proceedings as 
amici.
56
 The participation of these scholars is closely aligned with the role of the 
expert amicus as traditionally conceived – that is to say, as a disinterested friend of 
                                                        
56
 See for instance the invitation to submit an amicus curiae brief issued by the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to Professor A. Cassese, Professor K. Ambos, and McGill 
University Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism; See also an invitation to submit an amicus 
curiae brief issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to Professor D, Orentlicher in Prosecutor v. 
Kallon and Kamara (Decision on challenge to jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) (2004) at the 
decision’s preamble; see also the Taylor case discussed below, infra note 59. 
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the court, providing valuable expertise on what the law is. It can also be viewed as an 
offshoot of the traditional ‘Article 38’ approach towards the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists.    
 
A classic example of the invited academic amicus in action can be found in 
the appointment of Professors Philippe Sands and Diane Orentlicher as amici in the 
Charles Taylor case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2004.
57
 In their 
separate briefs, both amici came to the view – as summarized by the Court – that ‘… 
jurisdiction may be exercised over a serving Head of State in respect of international 
crimes, provided such crimes were to be tried before an international criminal 
tribunal’.
58
 On the question of whether the Special Court for Sierra Leone was such a 
tribunal, the amici both concluded that it was, and that the court was therefore entitled 
to exercise jurisdiction over Charles Taylor as an acting Head of State.
59
 
 
The Special Court in Taylor had exercised its power under Rule 74 of its 
statute to appoint the two amici, ‘[i]n view of the significance of the international law 
issues’.
60
 It stated that it was ‘grateful for these scholarly submissions’.
61
 At 
paragraphs 17-19 of its judgment, the Court summarized the views expressed by the 
amici, devoting more space to the scholarly submissions of Sands (23 lines) and 
Orentlicher (18 lines) than it did to the (unsolicited) submissions of the African Bar 
Association (5 lines). In articulating its reasoning, the Court referred to the 
                                                        
57
 Prosecutor v. Taylor (Charles Ghankay), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Case No SCSL-
2003-01-I, SCSL-03-01-I-059, ICL 25 (SCSL 2004), 31st May 2004, Appeals Chamber (SCSL).  
58
 Ibid, para 1. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid, para 2. 
61 Ibid. 
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submissions of the amici and those of counsel for the parties in the same breath,
62
 and 
was positively effusive in its endorsement of Professor Sands’ submissions: 
 
For the reasons that have been given, it is not difficult to accept and gratefully 
adopt the conclusions reached by Professor Sands who assisted the court as 
amicus curiae.
63
 
 
Later in the judgment, the court adopted Professor Orentlicher’s conclusions as its 
own, quoting from her amicus submission verbatim.
64
  
 
The scholar-adjudicator dialogue in this case was clearly productive. However, it 
did not amount to a major deviation from the standard ‘Article 38’ engagement with 
‘teachings’. The Special Court was firmly in control of the process, deciding whether 
to invite scholarly expertise, which scholar(s) to invite and which issues were to be 
addressed. Its reliance on scholarship was – in the language of its procedural rules –
‘desirable for the proper determination of the case’.
65
  
 
By definition, the ‘desirability’ criterion is much more difficult to satisfy when an 
amicus brief is unsolicited. Indeed, the degree of engagement with, and reliance on, 
the submissions of the amici in Taylor is only rarely on display when the submissions 
are unsolicited. As the following section will show, the scholar-adjudicator dialogue 
has been somewhat less productive in the case of unsolicited academic submissions. 
 
                                                        
62 Ibid, para 34. 
63
 Ibid, para 41. 
64
 Ibid, para 51. 
65
 Rule 74 of the SCSL’s Rules of Court. Like other international criminal tribunals (e.g. Lebanon, 
Cambodia) the SCSL takes the wording of its amicus provision from the ICTY.  
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3.2 The uninvited academic amicus 
 
For reasons of economy, this overview will not focus in detail on the specific legal 
issues discussed in the academic submissions under scrutiny. Rather, it will focus on 
the nature of the interventions and the kind of judicial reception they received.  
 
3.2.1 WTO Tribunals  
 
Several scholars have attempted to submit amicus briefs to WTO Tribunals. While 
under WTO Law the legal status of amicus submissions was originally unclear, the 
WTO’s Appellate Body (‘AB’) based its authority to accept unsolicited amicus briefs 
on the wide language of Article 13.2 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, according to which panels have the right ‘to seek information’ from 
‘any individual body’ or from ‘any relevant source’.
66
 
 
It seems therefore that WTO tribunals are open, at least in principle, to the 
submissions of academic amici, which are clearly capable of qualifying as a ‘relevant 
source’ of information. In practice however, WTO tribunals have been reluctant to 
consider such submissions.  
                                                        
66
 See United States – Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products, Report of the 
Appellate Body WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) [US-Shrimp, Appellate Body Report] para 104-110. This 
decision was later reaffirmed in several other cases, see for example United States – Imposition of 
countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and Bismuth carbon steel products originating in the 
United Kingdom, Report of the Panel, WT/DS138/R, 1999, at para 6.8. The Panel in this case rejected 
the amicus submission as it was submitted too late; United States – Imposition of countervailing duties 
on certain hot-rolled lead and Bismuth carbon steel products originating in the United Kingdom, 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS138/AB/R, (2000) at para 39; Australia – Measures affecting 
importation of salmon – recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, Report of the Panel WT/DS18/RW, 2000, 
at paras 7.8-7.9; European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (2002) Report of the 
Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R, at para 157. 
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We examined three amicus briefs, submitted by academics qua academics to 
WTO tribunals: a brief submitted by Luca Rubini (2013) in the Canada FIT case,
67
 a 
brief submitted by Robert Howse (2012) in the US Tuna Dolphin case,
68
 and a brief 
submitted by Robert Howse, Joanna Langille and Katie Sykes (2013) in the EC-Seals 
case.
69
 The briefs were largely ignored by the WTO tribunals. No reasons were given 
to explain the tribunals’ treatment of the amicus submissions. With respect to the 
briefs submitted by Rubini and Howse, the AB allowed the participants to express 
their views on these, but ‘did not find it necessary to rely on [them]’.
70
 The third brief, 
submitted by Howse et al, was deemed inadmissible on technical grounds.
71
 
 
One possible explanation for this frosty judicial reception can be found in the 
objection of several WTO member states to the involvement of amici (generally) in 
proceedings held by the AB. The objection is that, as appeals before the AB are only 
permitted on questions of law, and as the members of the AB are legal experts, the 
acceptance of amicus briefs seems redundant.
72
 This concern appears present in the 
minds of the adjudicators in one of the rare instances in which a WTO tribunal 
actually referred to an amicus brief, which had been submitted jointly by a legal clinic 
                                                        
67 L. Rubini, ‘Written submission of non-party amicus curiae’, submitted in Canada – Certain 
measures affecting the renewable energy generation sector, (2013) WT/DS412, WT/DS426 [Canada 
FIT]. 
68
 R. Howse, ‘Amicus Submission’, submitted in United States-Measures concerning the importation, 
marketing and sale of tuna and tuna products (2012) WT/DS381 [US Tuna]. 
69
R. Howse, J. Langille and K. Sykes, ‘Written submission of non-party amici curiae’ European 
Communities – Measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of seal products (2013) 
WT/DS400 [Howse et al.]. 
70 Canada FIT, AB Report, supra, note 67, at para 1.30; US Tuna, AB Report, supra, note 68, at para 8. 
71
 European Communities – Measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of seal products 
(2014) WTO Doc. WT/DS40/AB/R at para 1.15. 
72
 See review of the objections to amicus submissions in C.L. Lim, ‘The amicus brief at the WTO’ 
(2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 85,106. 
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and an advocacy group.
73
 The Tribunal cited only parts of the brief in which non-
WTO law issues were reviewed.
74
  
 
3.2.2 Investment Tribunals   
The role of the amicus in investment arbitration was traditionally conceived of as 
similar to that of a third-party ‘intervener’ in the British system, assisting the court 
while simultaneously giving voice to a public interest.
75
 The importance of the public 
interest being served in the context of amicus participation is emphasized both in the 
decisions of investment tribunals
76
 and in procedural regulations.
77
 Unsurprisingly 
therefore, the majority of amicus interventions in investor-state proceedings are filed 
by civil society organisations.
78
 
 
                                                        
73
 Amicus brief submitted by the Humane Society International and American College of Law, 
‘Written submission of non-party amici curiae’,in US Tuna, supra, note 68. 
74 US Tuna, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R at para 7.9. In an earlier case unsolicited 
amicus briefs were accepted, and even added to the case records, but never openly debated. See 
Australia – measures affecting importation of salmon – recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS18/RW (2000), at para 7.8, supra note 67 at Error! Bookmark not defined.102 at 
paras 7.182, 7.288, 7.363, 7.368,   
75
 On the ‘public interest’ rationale, see de Brabandere, supra, note 36 at 103. 
76
 Before the entering into force of the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules, the Suez Tribunal mentioned the 
public nature of the dispute (i.e. where cases are more than ‘simply a contract dispute’) as a relevant 
condition: Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine 
Republic, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae , 19 
May, 2005 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, at para 20; Methanex Corporation v. The United States of 
America (03 August 2005), (NAFTA Chapter 11, UNCITRAL) (Decision of the tribunal on petitions 
from third persons to intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’) at para 49; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. 
United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5 on amicus curiae, 2 
February 2007, para 51; Apotex, Appleton intervention, infra, note 81 at para 43.    
77
 See for example Art. 6(d) of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade 
Commission on non-disputing party participation  (2003), online: Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada, <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-en.pdf> [FTC Statement]; Art 1(4)(a) of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration (effective date: April 2014), which instructs a tribunal to consider  the ‘public 
interest’ when exercising discretion (as in the case of decisions on amici participation).  
78
 See generally N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder ‘Transparency and Amicus Curiae in ICSID Arbitrations’ 
in M.C. Cordonier Segger et al (eds.) Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer, 
2010) 191.  
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As far as the present authors are aware, there are no examples of amicus briefs 
submitted by academics qua academics in investment disputes. However, the 
approach of the Tribunal in the Apotex v US dispute (2013) regarding an amicus brief 
submitted by Barry Appleton is highly instructive for present purposes.  
 
Mr. Appleton is a prominent investment lawyer, not a university academic, but 
he is – and holds himself out to be in his submission – a renowned expert in the field 
who has published widely in investment law generally and on NAFTA issues in 
particular.
79
 The carefully reasoned procedural Order of the Tribunal rejecting his 
application is an unusually comprehensive judicial statement concerning the 
participation of individual legal experts as amici in investor-state proceedings, and it 
therefore seems apt to consider the decision in the context of the present study.  
Mr. Appleton claimed that, bas d on his extensive experience and expert 
knowledge, he could be of service to the Tribunal.
80
 More specifically, he claimed 
that he could provide clarification regarding the meaning of certain investment treaty 
obligations.
81
 He claimed moreover that there was a ‘public interest’ in permitting his 
intervention, in the sense that the public has an interest ‘in the proper interpretation of 
the Treaty and in ensuring that the NAFTA Chapter 11 process benefits from the 
perception of being more open and transparent’.
82
  
                                                        
79 See B. Appleton, ‘Petition for leave to submit non-disputing party (amicus curiae) submission of 
Barry Appleton’ (2013), in Apotex v. USA, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1..   
80
 Mr. Appleton’s experience, according to his petition, includes serving as an advisor to sub-national 
governments during the negotiations of the NAFTA, extensive practice as a litigant in investment 
disputes, and authoring two books on the NAFTA.  
81
 Apotex Holdings Inc and Apotex Inc v. The United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1 (Procedural Order on the Participation of the Applicant, Mr. Barry Appleton, as a Non-
Disputing Party) at paras 11, 30 and 34.  
82 Paragraph 14 of the Order, citing paragraph 18 of Mr Appleton’s submission. 
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The Tribunal had ‘no doubt’ that Mr. Appleton’s expertise and experience 
were extensive, and it accepted that his proposed intervention fell within the scope of 
the dispute.
83
 However, the Tribunal held that Mr. Appleton’s extensive legal 
expertise did not of themselves justify his amicus participation according to the 
criteria in the rules.
84
 The question, according to the Tribunal, was whether a non-
party could provide ‘a different perspective and a particular insight on the issues in 
dispute, on the basis of either substantive knowledge or relevant expertise or 
experience that go beyond, or differ in some respect from, that of the disputing parties 
themselves’.
85
 The Tribunal held that counsel for the parties were sufficiently 
knowledgeable and experienced to provide the Tribunal with the necessary legal 
insights and perspectives.
86
 It thus concluded that Mr. Appleton was very unlikely to 
provide the tribunal with ‘any particular perspective or insight different from the 
Disputing Parties’.
87
  
Up to this point, it seems clear that the same obstacles would be faced by any 
individual expert, whether a university academic, a practising lawyer, or an individual 
with one foot in practice and one in academia. However, it is important to note that 
Mr. Appleton’s professional connections as a practising lawyer militated in important 
respects against the acceptance of his application. The Tribunal held that: ‘It seems 
that the Applicant’s “significant interest” in this arbitration lies only in having this 
Tribunal adopt legal interpretations of NAFTA that he favours that could be 
advantageous to his clients in his pending and possible future NAFTA cases’.
88
 In a 
related finding on the question of ‘public interest’, the Tribunal held that ‘what lies 
                                                        
83
 Apotex Procedural Order, supra note 81, at paras 32 and 36.  
84 The specific rule in question being section B(6)(a) of the NAFTA FTC Statement. 
85
 Apotex Procedural Order, supra note 81, at para 31. 
86
 Ibid, at para 32.  
87
 Ibid, at para 33.  
88 Ibid, at para 40. 
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behind Mr. Appleton’s asserted public interest is a particular and professional interest 
and not a “public interest” affecting him personally …’.
89
  
 
The approach of the Tribunal in Apotex suggests that the door is not closed to 
scholars who wish to intervene in investor-state proceedings as amici. It can be 
inferred from the decision that professional detachment from the world of investment 
law practice may be conducive to success as an amicus; in this respect, full time 
academics, untainted by involvement with clients, may be looked upon more 
favourably than investment law practitioners. Furthermore, persons capable of 
providing a ‘different perspective’ from the parties or ‘a particular insight’, are likely 
to find investment tribunals more prepared to accept and engage with their 
submissions. Those who can demonstrate expertise in areas of law other than 
investment law may also be favoured by tribunals, given the requirement that the 
amicus should provide a distinctive perspective or insight, which counsel for the 
parties cannot be relied upon to provide.  
 
Several examples exist of cases in which non-investment law expertise was 
required, and accepted, by investment tribunals. Most notably, since 2010 the EU 
Commission has been invited to intervene,
90
 and has intervened of its own initiative,
91
 
in several cases in order to provide expert knowledge of EU law. For example, in 
Electrabel S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary (2012)
92
 the Tribunal accepted an amicus 
brief submitted by the European Commission. The Tribunal specifically emphasized 
                                                        
89
 Ibid, at para 43. 
90
 Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010 at para 154.  
91
 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, 11 
December 2013 [Micula]; Electrabel S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary (Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability) ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19. 
92 Electrabel, supra note 91. 
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the Commission’s ability to contribute expert knowledge in fields such as the 
relations between EU law and the Energy Charter, and with respect to EU law on state 
aid.
93
 The Tribunal described the Commission’s submission as ‘a lengthy, scholarly 
and important document for these arbitration proceedings’ and made several 
references to it.
94
  
 
While the role of the EU Commission in these cases cannot be considered as 
that of a classic independent expert amicus (as stated by the Elecrabel Tribunal, the 
EU Commission had ‘much more than “a significant interest” in these arbitration 
proceedings’
95
), it is clear that in complex fields of law, investment tribunals will 
sometimes embrace ‘scholarly’ xpertise offered by external actors. Theoretical space 
appears to exist for amicus participation by scholars who possess the right type of 
expertise, but it remains to be seen wheth r this space will be exploited. 
3.2.3 The European Court of Human Rights  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been accepting amicus briefs 
since 1981. As with other forums, NGOs are by far the most prolific amici before the 
Strasbourg Court. Certain NGOs, like Interights and the International Commission of 
Jurists, have a particularly strong track record in this regard.
96
 
From an extensive review of amicus submissions before the ECtHR, it would 
seem for the most part that in cases involving academics, the individuals in question 
                                                        
93
 Ibid, at para 4.89.  
94
 Ibid, at para 4.91 (emphasis supplied). 
95
 Ibid, at para 4.92.  
96 Van den Eynde, supra, note 42, 285. 
Page 24 of 34
Cambridge University Press
Leiden Journal of International Law
For Review Only
25 
 
either represented or collaborated with NGOs,
97
 or acted as leaders of advocacy-
oriented law clinics.
98
 
A rare example of the ECtHR engaging with an amicus brief submitted by 
academics qua academics, can be found in Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), where 
the ECtHR granted permission to Professors Francoise Hampson and Noam Lubell to 
submit an amicus brief.
99
 The Court summarized the amicus submission – which dealt 
with the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law – 
in considerable detail, and while it did not refer to the brief in the operational part of 
its judgment, the reasoning in the majority’s decision echoes the arguments made by 
Professors Hampson and Lubell to some extent.
100
  
While it would be unwise to draw conclusions from a single case, it is possible 
that the ECtHR’s approach in Hassan signals an opening up by the Court to academic 
amici. Even if it does not, it is possible that in light of Hassan more academics will be 
encouraged to submit amicus briefs to the ECtHR qua academics, rather than riding 
on the coat-tails of NGOs and law clinics.  
 
 
                                                        
97
 See among other examples, an amicus brief submitted by M. Hamilton in collaboration with the 
International Commission of Jurists and ILGA Europe, in Milica Dordevic and others v. Serbia (2014), 
5591/10.   
98
 These include such organizations as the University of Toronto’s Centre for Reproductive Rights, 
International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme, the Yale Law School National 
Litigation Project, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, and many others, all of which mention 
‘advocacy’ as their declared objectives.  
99
 ‘Amicus curiae brief submitted by Professor Francoise Hampson and Professor Noam Lubell of the 
Human Rights Centre, University of Essex’ (2013), submitted in Hassan v. United Kingdom, (2014) 
297950/09.  
100
 Hassan v. United Kingdom, (Judgement) (2014) 297950/09. The summary of the amicus 
submissions is at paras 91-95. The Court seems to draw on the amici’s assessment of the ICJ’s 
approach towards the co-existence of international humanitarian law and human rights law in situations 
of armed conflict (cf paras 93 and 104).    
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3.2.4 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
Since 1982 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has received more 
than 500 amicus briefs, mostly from NGOs, individuals, and law school clinics.
101
 
The IACtHR is arguably the international forum that is most receptive to unsolicited 
amicus briefs. Its Rules of Procedure are among the most permissive of any 
international court or tribunal; they stipulate that anyone who wishes to act as amicus 
may submit a brief at any stage in the proceedings (although within 15 days of a 
public hearing).
102
 Amicus briefs can relate to ‘the facts contained in the application 
or legal considerations over the subject-matter of the proceeding’.
103
  
The format of amicus briefs in the IACtHR tends to mirror the US practice 
closely, as does the propensity for submitting briefs on behalf of a large number of 
signatories.
104
 These briefs include ‘group’ submissions by academic authors, often in 
conjunction with NGOs and law school clinics.
105
  
Despite a long tradition of interventions by academic amici, interventions by 
academics qua academics are relatively rare. The first scholar’s brief ever to be 
accepted by the IACtHR was submitted by Professor Raúl Emilio Vinuesa in 1986. 
                                                        
101 J.Pasqualucci, The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2nd ed. 
Cambridge University Press,2013) 72. For a list of amici appearing before the IACtHR, see F. Rivera 
Juaristi, ‘The Amicus Curiae in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1982-2013)’, SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488073.  
102 Art 41, Rules of Court (2009). Added by the Court during its LXXXII Ordinary Period of Sessions, 
in the session held on January 29, 2009. 
103
 Art 2.3, Rules of Court (2009). 
104
 See e.g. an amicus brief submitted by 56 amici, including 24 legal scholars, NGOs, Legal clinics, 
and practitioners: Amnesty et al. ‘Amici Curiae brief in support of petitioners’ submitted in Campo 
Algodonero et al. v. Mexico Case Nos. 12.496, 12.497, 12.498, available online: 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/rossrights/documents/2009-07-
07AmicusBriefCampoAlgodonero.pdf. 
105 See e.g. ibid; see also Amicus brief submitted by Labor, Civil Rights and Immigrants’ Rights 
Organizations in the United States, in the matter of request for Advisory Opinion, OC-18 February 
2003, 4. While the latter submission was presented in the name of fifty ‘Labor, Civil Rights and 
Immigrants’ Rights Organizations in the United States’, four of the five listed authors are university 
academics.  
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The case was an Advisory Opinion concerning the legal interpretation of the word 
‘laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. While 
recognising the submission made by Professor Vinuesa, the IACtHR did not refer to 
or rely on it directly in its decision.
106
 In written comments, the IACtHR’s First 
Secretary described the submission, by a law professor ‘who did not claim any 
affiliation with an NGO’ as a ‘positive development’.
107
  
Other examples of scholars’ briefs submitted to the IACtHR include 
submissions by notable scholars such as James Crawford (2004), Vaughan Lowe and 
Guy Goodwin-Gill (2002), Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade (1994)
108
 and others 
(2012),
109
 as well as several ‘group’ submissions by academics with no NGO 
involvement (e.g. Romano et al. (2012),
110
 and Romano et al.(“2012)).
111
 
The IACtHR tends to summarize amicus submissions in its decisions, but not 
engage with them directly in its reasoning. The extent to which the thinking of 
individual judges is informed by academic amicus submissions is difficult to fathom. 
The present authors have attempted to reach out to judges and officials at the IACtHR 
and other forums on this point via e-mail, to no avail.
112
 
                                                        
106
 Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, May 9, 1986, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 6 (1986), available 
online: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4f.htm.  
107
 C. Moyer, ‘The Role of Amicus Curiae in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in La Corte-
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Estudios y documentos, (Instituto Interamericano de derechos 
humanos, 1986) 103, 106.  
108 See list of amici compiled by Juaristi, supra note 101.  
109
 See four scholars’ briefs submitted by E. Haba; H. Gullco et al.; A. Huerta Zepeda et al.; and R. 
Nieto Navia et al., in Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment of 
November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257.  
110 Amicus brief submitted by Romano et al. in Murillo ibid.  
111
 Amicus brief submitted by Romano et al. in Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Judgement of 
October 24, 2012. 
112
 It is tempting to draw conclusions regarding the state of the scholar-adjudicator dialogue from the 
wall of silence that met our e-mails, but our experience is merely anecdotal.  
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3.2.5 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has 
considered, and accepted, numerous amicus briefs. A few of those briefs were 
submitted by international law academics qua academics. Notably, in 1995 a brief 
was submitted by Professor Christine Chinkin, whose stated aim was to ‘present legal 
and policy arguments for supporting claims of non-disclosure to the public and of 
anonymity from the accused.’
113
 The ICTY acknowledged Professor Chinkin’s brief 
in its decision,
114
 cited it, and relied on it with respect to several issues.
115
 
In 1997 the ICTY permitted the submission of thirteen amicus briefs in the 
Blaskic case, nine of which were submitted by academics without the involvement of 
any advocacy group.
116
 The amici commented on purely legal issues concerning the 
ICTY’s power to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign state or to 
governmental officials, and the appropriate remedies in the case of non-compliance 
with such an order.
117
 The ICTY relied on,
118
 and engaged with
119
 the amicus 
submissions to a significant extent in its decision. 
The ICTY stated that its decision to reach out to the academic community was 
motivated by ‘the importance of the issues’ in Blaskic.
120
 The briefs that the ICTY 
eventually received were from renowned scholars and they proved to be a useful 
resource. As with invited amici, and the traditional approach towards engagement 
                                                        
113
 C.Chinkin, ‘Amicus curiae brief on protective measures for victims and witnesses’ submitted in 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1996) Case No. IT-94-1-T. 
114 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1996) Case No. IT-94-1-T at para 10.  
115
 Ibid, at paras 39, 46, 47, 56.  
116
 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (Judgement on the request of the Republic of Croatia for review of 
the decision of trial chamber II of 18 July 1997) (1997) Case No. IT-95-14, para 10. 
117 Ibid.  
118
 The ICTY cited the amici 11 times in its decision: ibid, at footnotes 20-22, 38, 49, 61, 64, 71, 74, 
75, 79, 101. 
119
 Ibid, at paras 21, 29, 30, 43, 57.   
120 Ibid, at para 8.  
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with doctrine, the Court initiated the dialogue and dictated its parameters (albeit with 
less predictability concerning the provenance, quantity and quality of the 
submissions). If an open call for academic amicus submissions were repeated today, 
one wonders whether the Court registry would be deluged with submissions of 
indifferent quality.   
In other cases where the ICTY has not actively called for academic assistance, 
it has been reluctant to engage with academic amici. In the Gotovina & Markac case 
(2012) a group of legal experts comprised mostly of law professors, some with 
extensive practical experience, submitted an amicus brief to the ICTY.
121
 The brief 
was submitted purportedly ‘for the sole purpose’ of offering expertise in international 
humanitarian law.
122
  
The ICTY rejected this submission for several reasons. First, the ICTY stated 
that the submission ‘repeats the task undertaken by the Trial Chamber and by the 
appeal briefs of Gotovina and the Prosecution’.
123
  The Tribunal also observed that 
one of the amici neglected to disclose prior involvement in the case (as expert witness 
for the defence), and therefore did not comply with the ICTY guidelines on amicus 
submissions. This omission, the Tribunal stated, raised concerns about the amici’s 
objectivity.
124
 
The Gotovina Tribunal’s decision by no means closes the door to academic 
amici. As with the Apotex case discussed above, it is implicit in the Tribunal’s 
decision that future submissions which have the quality (and appearance) of 
                                                        
121
 L.Blanc et al. Application and proposed amicus curiae brief, submitted in Prosecutor v. Ante 
Gotovina & Mladen Markac, (2012) Case No. IT-06-90-A.    
122
 Ibid, at para 1.  
123
 Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac, (Decision on the application and proposed 
amicus curiae brief) (2012) Case No. IT-06-90-A, at para 11.  
124 Ibid, at para 12.   
Page 29 of 34
Cambridge University Press
Leiden Journal of International Law
For Review Only
30 
 
neutrality, and which contribute valuable expert knowledge that goes beyond the 
parties’ submissions, may be accepted by the ICTY, even if they are totally 
unsolicited.       
3.2.6 The International Criminal Court  
The International Criminal Court receives amicus briefs on a regular basis, mostly 
from civil society organizations and individuals. In at least two instances, scholars 
have attempted to intervene qua scholars. In 2010, two US professors requested to 
submit their ‘observations on some issues related to the Prosecutor's Request’ for 
authorisation to investigate the Situation in Kenya.
125
 The pre-trial Chamber rejected 
this application. The Chamber’s cursory decision states that ‘the proposed submission 
of observations would not assist in reaching a proper determination on the 
Prosecutor's Request’.
126
 
In a later ICC decision (Laurent Gbagbo 2013) a group of academics asked 
permission to submit an amicus brief.
127
 The amici asked to intervene as legal experts 
‘on the law of crime against humanity’, and offered to provide their observations with 
respect to two legal issues.
128
 Despite the defendant’s objections to the request, the 
amicus submission was accepted by the ICC. The Tribunal explained that the 
observations of the amici ‘appear to be of relevance’ to the matter at hand and ‘may 
be desirable for the proper determination of the appeal’.
129
 The amici’s observations 
                                                        
125
 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Decision on application to appear as amicus curiae and related 
requests) (2010) Case No. ICC-01-09, at para 2.  
126 Ibid, at para 8.  
127
 Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo (Decision on the “request to submit amicus curiae 
observations”) (2013) Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11. 
128
 Ibid, at para 4. 
129 Ibid, at para 10. 
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were eventually not considered by the ICC’s Appeal Chamber,
130
 as it was decided 
that the issue dealt with by the amici could not be discussed in the appeal process.
131
   
4 REFLECTIONS ON AN EMERGING TREND 
 
The body of practice examined above is not particularly extensive, and a significant 
proportion of academic amicus interventions are very recent. However, there are 
enough examples across various international courts and tribunals to justify our 
description of the academic amicus phenomenon as an emerging trend. Certain 
patterns are visible, and tentative predictions may be made as to the likely 
development of this phenomenon.  
 
The growing number of academic submissions is only part of the story. Prior 
to 2010, the interventions of academic amici tended to focus on the more ‘amicus-
friendly’ forums like the IACtHR and ICTY. In the past five years, scholars have 
started to intervene not only in greater numbers but also before more forums 
(including notoriously ‘amicus-unfriendly’ forums like WTO tribunals).  
 
When an academic amicus is directly appointed (as in Taylor)
132
 or when there 
has been an open call for academic submissions (as in Blaskic)
133
, the resulting 
scholar-adjudicator dialogue tends to be productive, as one would expect. It could be 
viewed as an iteration of the traditional approach towards engaging with the 
                                                        
130 Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo (Judgement on the appeal of the prosecutor) (2013) Case 
No. ICC-02/11-01/11. 
131
 Ibid, at para 54.  
132
 Supra, note 57. 
133 Supra, note 116. 
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‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’ (albeit a more fluid and context-
sensitive form of engagement than the more usual recourse to written doctrine).    
 
International adjudicators are understandably more reluctant to engage with 
unsolicited submissions from academics. There are however some chinks of light. The 
recent cases of Hassan (2014) in the ECtHR
134
 and Gbagbo (2012) in the ICC
135
 are 
relatively rare examples of judicial willingness to engage with academic amici. For an 
earlier example of constructive engagement, one might consider the ICTY’s reliance 
on Professor Chinkin’s submissions in Tadic (1996).
136
 The IACtHR in particular 
shows a general willingness to admit academic amicus briefs (in line with its 
sympathetic approach to amici in general). The extent to which the reasoning of 
IACtHR judges is actually informed by the academic submissions whose existence is 
acknowledged in the judgments remains an open question, deserving of further study.  
 
In certain cases, reasoned judicial rejections of academic amicus briefs 
provide useful instruction regarding the elements that are conducive to the success of 
such briefs. In Gotovina (2012)
137
 and Apotex (2011)
138
 the ICTY and NAFTA 
Tribunal respectively both emphasized: (a) the requirement that the interventions of 
academic amici should be untainted by potential conflicts of interest or the 
appearance thereof; and (b) the importance of bringing distinctive expertise to the 
table that the parties to a dispute cannot be expected to provide.    
                                                        
134 Supra, note 100. 
135
 Supra, note 130. 
136
 Supra, note 114. 
137
 Supra, note 123. 
138 Supra, note 81. 
Page 32 of 34
Cambridge University Press
Leiden Journal of International Law
For Review Only
33 
 
 
The Blaskic example is perhaps the most resounding academic amicus success 
story. A key feature of that example was the Tribunal’s open call for academic amicus 
participation. This approach arguably represents a useful compromise between the 
rigidity of the ‘invited expert’ model and the chaos that might result from a general 
open-door policy for academic amici. If academics are aware that a certain court or 
tribunal is well disposed to receiving academic assistance in a certain case, but not in 
another case, they may be able to target their interventions more efficiently, for the 
benefit of all concerned.  
 
If academic amicus interventions continue to increase as they have done in 
recent years, the Blaskic approach may become more popular among international 
courts and tribunals, eager to guard against the kind of deluge of unwanted ‘proffered 
assistance’ feared by the ICJ.
139
 Another ICTY practice that may gain broader 
popularity is the employment of amicus officers in the registries of courts and 
tribunals, with a view to managing the reception of amicus briefs more effectively.
140
     
 
While unsolicited academic amicus briefs have enjoyed limited success, the 
foregoing analysis shows that there are some signs that international adjudicators are 
prepared to listen. Adjudicators remain understandably keen to control the terms of 
the conversation and understandably sceptical of claims to scholarly neutrality, but it 
would be unduly gloomy to characterize the current state of affairs as a ‘dialogue of 
                                                        
139 ICJ/Reisman correspondence, supra, note 41, at 638-9. 
140
 The ICTY’s amicus officer does not extend to making decisions on the merits of amicus 
submissions. Applications are sent to the Trial Chamber for a decision on whether they should be 
admitted. See ICTY Publication (IT/122), ‘Information Concerning the Submission of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs’, (27 March, 1997) para 4.  
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the deaf’. Equally, it is unlikely that the emerging trend we have identified will grow 
into something that radically transforms the scholar-adjudicator dialogue as 
traditionally conceived. It seems more likely that there will be a gradual recalibration 
of the traditional approach towards ‘teachings’, as international adjudicators come to 
appreciate that academic amicus briefs – both solicited and unsolicited – provide a 
valuable opportunity to engage in real time with scholarship that is sensitive to the 
specific context of a given case.  
 
The ‘invited expert’ approach may have the advantage of efficiency, but ‘the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’ are scattered around the 
various nations, and their identity may not always be obvious to an adjudicator 
embedded in a particular tradition. A preparedness to engage with unsolicited 
academic briefs would promote plurality and reduce excessive reliance on reputation 
as a measure of scholarly quality. In a dynamic and complex international 
environment, in which novel legal questions frequently arise, unsolicited academic 
amicus submissions may come to be seen as a valuable judicial resource to 
supplement – but by no means replace – judicial engagement with written doctrine 
and invited expert amici.  
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